Taipei Exchange Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure Disclosure Report (TR)

Responding institution: Taipei Exchange Jurisdiction(s) in which the FMI operates: Republic of China (Taiwan) Authority(ies) regulating, supervising or overseeing the FMI: Financial Supervisory Commission, R.O.C The date of this disclosure is 2023.06.07. This disclosure can also be found at http://www.tpex.org.tw For further information, please contact server@tpex.org.tw

I. Executive summary

This report is a disclosure document that presents the results of a selfassessment conducted byTaipei Exchange ("TPEx") as a TR operator in accordance with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures published by CPSS-IOSCO in April 2012 and its latest Disclosure Framework and Assessment Methodology published in December the same year.

To determine whether the TPEx has been observing the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) in operating the TR system, the scope of assessment examined PFMI that apply to the TPEx's TR system, including Principle 1 to 3, 15, and 17 to 24. Reference materials used by the TPEx in the process of this assessment included internal and external materials, such as laws and regulations, information on the TPEx's board of directors, corporate governance information, and internal operating procedures.

The TPEx created a Financial Derivatives Trading Information Repository System ("TR system") according to an administrative commission by the competent authority, the Financial Supervisory Commission. Pursuant to the said commission and the Regulations Governing Securities Firms prescribed by the competent authority, banks (including branches of foreign banks in Taiwan), bills finance companies, insurance companies, and securities firms are required to report their over-the-counter derivatives transactions to the TR system.

The TR system only accepts reporting of derivatives trading information from financial institutions, and is not involved in the payment, clearing, or settlement of such transactions. The TPEx established the TR system in accordance with the law to assist the competent authority in carrying out its market supervision duties. The TPEx does not charge financial institutions any fees for use of services provided through the TR system.

II. Summary of major changes since the last update of the disclosure

This disclosure is made in accordance with Principle 23 "Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data" after the Disclosure Framework and Assessment Methodology was announced by CPSS-IOSCO in December 2012.

This is an update to TPEx's previous disclosure document dated July 2021. Since the TPEx TR is linked to the TAIFEX OTC Derivatives Central

Clearing System and helps financial institutions to transmit trade data to the TAIFEX for central clearing from July 25, 2022, this document contains revisions to TPEx's new services and new practices.

III. General background on TPEx

General description of the TPEx and the markets it serves

Taipei Exchange (TPEx) is a multifunctional market for the issuance and trading of financial products with many unique features. The TPEx operates in a similar capacity to the Taiwan Stock Exchange in that it provides a central exchange market for the trading of listed stocks. In addition, the TPEx offers over-the-counter trading mechanisms for the TPEx Emerging Stock Market (ESM), government and corporate bonds, and derivatives, making it a diverse provider of financial trading services.

Over-the-counter trading of securities in Taiwan was launched in February 1988 under the management of the Taipei Securities Dealers Association (TSDA). To build a more robust capital market and enhance overthe-counter trading functions, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) began holding a number of meetings in 1993 to thoroughly examine the system, functions, and organizational framework of the over-the-counter market. The MOF decided to set up an over-the-counter center as a non-profit body to promote the development of the over-the-counter market.

In 1994, after a succession of sponsor meetings, the organizational charter and initial business plan were drafted. On July 20, 1994, the MOF Securities Exchange Commission appointed 20 members to a preparatory committee to work on the establishment of the TPEx. The first board of directors' meeting was called on July 28, 1994. The organization was registered as a juristic person on September 26, 1994 and formally established on November 1 of the same year to take over the business of over-the-counter market pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act. The TPEx's new electronic trading system was also launched on December 30 that year to increase the efficiency of trading.

General organization of TPEx

The TPEx called its first board of directors' meeting on July 28, 1994, was registered as a juristic person on September 26, 1994, and formally

established on November 1 the same year. The initial fund of the TPEx was donated by three sponsors, namely the Chinese Securities Association, Taiwan Stock Exchange, and Taiwan Depository & Clearing Association.

The TPEx's board of directors is independent and serves the public interest. The board of directors is composed of 15 directors who are appointed by the Financial Supervisory Commission and selected by sponsors from among sponsors, experts, scholars and securities professionals. Directors serving as a representative of a sponsor of the organization shall not be more than one third of all directors. Directors serving as a member representative of the Chinese Securities Association shall not be less than one third of all directors. Directors serve a term of three years and may be re-appointed.

The board of directors is the highest governing body of the TPEx. The chairman of the board calls and chairs board meetings. The chairman represents the TPEx externally, and the Managing Director & CEO is tasked with overseeing the business direction of the TPEx as determined by the board of directors. The TPEx has one to two Deputy CEOs and a Chief Administrative Officer assist the Managing Director & CEO. The TPEx has eleven departments: Startup Incubation, Listing Examination, Listing Supervision, Trading, Market Surveillance, Bond, Information, Intermediaries Service, Administration, and Strategy & In ternational Relations, as well as an Internal Audit Office directly under the board of directors.

Legal and regulatory framework

The TPEx TR system is built on an administrative commission by the competent authority and relevant regulations, including the Regulations Governing Securities Firms. The competent authority refers to the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). Pursuant to Article 2 of the Organic Act Governing the Establishment of the Financial Supervisory Commission, the FSC shall be the competent authority for development, supervision, regulation, and examination of financial markets and financial service enterprises. The FSC is an independent agency that exercises independent power provided by law. It is the highest supervisory authority in Taiwan's financial market. **System design and operations**

The TPEx established the TR system according to an administrative commission by the competent authority, the Financial Supervisory Commission. Pursuant to the said commission and the Regulations Governing Securities Firms prescribed by the competent authority, banks (including branches of foreign banks in Taiwan), bills finance companies, insurance companies, and securities firms are required to report their over-the-counter derivatives trading information to the TR.

According to the TPEx's Administration Rules for Financial Derivative Trade Database, domestic financial institutions can becomes a TR participant by signing a Contract for Financial Derivative Trade Database with the TPEx, and report trading information in a timely manner according to the aforementioned Administration Rules. The TR system only accepts reporting of derivatives trading information from financial institutions, and is not involved in the payment, clearing, or settlement of such transactions. The TPEx established the TR system in accordance with the law to assist the competent authority in carrying out its market supervision duties. The TPEx does not charge financial institutions any fees for use of services provided through the TR system.

The TPEx produces market information reports and supervisory reports based on the information filed by participants for use by the public and the competent authority. The TPEx designs supervisory reports in line with the needs of the competent authority. The competent authority can download supervisory reports via an online system. The TPEx also regularly discloses trading information, transaction volumes, and outstanding balance on its website according to the market information reports approved by the competent authority, which are freely available for inquiry by the public.

Principle	by-principle summary narrative disclosure	
Principle 1: Legal	basis	
An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable		
legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant		
jurisdictions.		
Summary	All of the TPEx's activities relating to the	
narrative	collection, processing, and use of over-the-counter	
	derivatives trading information have a well-founded	
	and clear legal basis, and these legal bases have	
	regulatory priority. The rules, procedures and	

IV. Principle-by-principle summary narrative disclosure

contracts drawn up by the TPEx have all been
reviewed and approved by the competent authority.
Hence, actions taken by the TPEx under these rules
and procedures have a high degree of certainty,
which ensures that the TPEx will not encounter
issues such as service activities being suspended or
deferred.

Principle 2: Governance

An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.

Summary	The TPEx gives high priority consideration to
narrative	system security and efficiency and explicitly
	supports financial stability and other relevant public
	interest concerns. The TPEx's organizational charter
	specifically outlines the operating procedure for
	board of directors, and clearly defines the authority
	and responsibility of the board of directors and the
	management. Members of the board of directors
	comprise senior executive officers of the TPEx,
	representatives of the business associations,
	representatives of the competent authorities, and
	scholars. Directors and supervisors with a conflict of
	interest should recuse themselves from making
	relevant decisions. The chairman calls and chairs
	board meetings. Except where otherwise provided in
	the charter, any resolution made by the board must
	have the consent of at least the majority of directors
	present in a meeting attended by at least the
	majority of all directors. To uphold the interests of
	stakeholders, all major decisions of the TPEx are
	clearly communicated to stakeholders and disclosed
	to the public. The TPEx's Internal Audit Office
	reports directly to the board of directors. In addition,
	the oversight of the competent authority and the
	TPEx's own comprehensive corporate governance
	are sufficient to support its financial stability and

enhance	security	and	effici	ency	to	facilita	ate th	e
TPEx's	developr	nent	and	prom	ote	the	publi	c
interest.								

Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Summary	The TR system collects and processes reported
narrative	information, and also transmits the central clearing
	trade data. It is not subject to legal, credit, liquidity
	or operational risks. In the management of
	operational risks, standard operating procedures are
	established and offsite redundancy mechanism is in
	place to ensure quick service recovery.

Principle 4: Credit risk

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposure to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two largest participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain, at a minimum, total financial resources sufficient to cover the default of the one participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

Summary narrative

Not related to TR

Principle 5: Collateral

An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative

Summary narrativeNot related to TRPrinciple 6: MarginA CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for a products through an effective margin system that is risk-based an regularly reviewed.Summary narrativeNot related to TRPrinciple 7: Liquidity riskAn FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidit risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevance currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and			
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currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and			
multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree			
confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that shou			
include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and i			
affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidi			
obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.			
Summary Not related to TR			
narrative			
Principle 8: Settlement finality			
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimu			
by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FM			
should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.			
Summary Not related to TR			
narrative			
Principle 9: Money settlements			
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank mone			
where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI			
should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk			
arising from the use of commercial bank money.			
Summary Not related to TR			
narrative			
Principle 10: Physical deliveries			
An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delive			
of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor			
and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.			
Summary Not related to TR			

narrative					
Principle 11: Cen	tral securities depositories				
A CSD should hav	e appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the				
integrity of secur	rities issues and minimise and manage the risks				
associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should					
maintain securities	untain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their				
transfer by book er	ntry.				
Summary	Not related to TR				
narrative					
Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems					
If an FMI settles t	ransactions that involve the settlement of two linked				
obligations (for ex	ample, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it				
should eliminate p	principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of				
-	pon the final settlement of the other.				
Summary	Not related to TR				
narrative					
Principle 13: Part	nciple 13: Participant-default rules and procedures				
An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures					
to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be					
designed to ensure	esigned to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses				
and liquidity press	ures and continue to meet its obligations.				
Summary	Not related to TR				
narrative					
Principle 14: Segregation and portability					
A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and					
portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral					
provided to the CC	P with respect to those positions.				
Summary	Not related to TR				
narrative					
Principle 15: General business risk					
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk					
and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential					
general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as					
a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets					
should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-					
down of critical op	erations and services.				
Summary	The TPEx TR provides a platform for participants to				
narrative	report trading information, and also transmits the				

central clearing trade data. Hence, it does not pose a
risk to the TPEx's business operations. In addition,
the TPEx is financially sound with liquid net assets
that can cover up to 38 months of current operating
expenses. The TPEx also examines its business
operations periodically to properly manage its
general business risks.

Principle 16: Custody and investment risks

An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimize the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.

Summary	Not related to TR
narrative	

Principle 17: Operational risk

An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.

Summary	The TR system is an internally developed system	
narrative	provided for use by participants who have entered a	
	contract with the TPEx. The TR system is not	
	involved in payment, clearing, or settlement of	
	transactions, and is only linked to the TAIFEX OTC	
	Derivatives Central Clearing System. It also comes	
	with an offsite redundancy and crisis management	
	mechanism. Therefore, the TR system is highly	
	secure and reliable, and able to handle potential	
	operational risks.	
Principle 18: Access and participation requirements		

le 18: Access and participation requirements

An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.

Summary	TR parti	cipa	nts r	eport deriva	tives trans	actions as
narrative	required	by	the	competent	authority.	Financial

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	institutions are direct participants that may use the	
	TR services after signing a contract with the TPEx.	
	The relevant rules and information are available on	
	the TPEx website. The TPEx periodically examines	
	the compliance with participation requirements by	
	participants. Participants who no longer meet the	
	requirements of the competent authority may	
	terminate the contract with the TPEx and cease	
	participation.	
Principle 19: Tier	ed participation arrangements	
An FMI should ic	dentify, monitor, and manage the material risks to	
the FMI arising from	m tiered participation arrangements.	
Summary	Not applicable.	
narrative	No tiered participation arrangements applicable to	
	TPEx's TR.	
Principle 20: FMI	links	
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify,		
monitor, and manage link-related risks.		
Summary	The TPEx TR is now only linked to the TAIFEX	
narrative	OTC Derivatives Central Clearing System. Since	
	the TAIFEX is an FMI highly supervised by the	
	competent authority, the related risks should be	
	manageable.	
-	ciency and effectiveness	
An FMI should be	efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of	
its participants and the markets it serves.		
Summary	TR-related systems are designed to meet the	
narrative	supervisory needs of the competent authority and	
	to facilitate use by participants, and electronic	
	processing is employed to enhance efficiency, and	
	hence has achieved the objectives of efficiency and	
	effectiveness.	
Principle 22: Com	munication procedures and standards	
An FMI should	use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant	
internationally acc	epted communication procedures and standards in	
and and a fastitude as		
order to facilitate effective	fficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	
Summary	fficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording. The TR adopts Website Architecture and	

uses internationally accepted communication
protocols by allowing participants to upload files in
CSV or TXT format. The TR also adopts the
HTTPS (HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure) to
meet internationally accepted communication
standards. Currently, the TR system does not
involve cross-border payment, clearing, settlement,
or recording operations.

Principle 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.

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Summary	The TPEx has established comprehensive and clear
narrative	rules and procedures for the TR system and clearly
	defined the rights and obligations of system
	participants. Such information is disclosed on the
	TPEx website and available for inquiry by
	participants and the public. The TPEx has held
	many sessions of workshops to help participants
	understand system design and key procedures. The
	TPEx also produced a written guide to help
	participants use the system accurately.

Principle 24: Disclosure of market data by trade repositories A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.

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Summary	The TPEx designed the supervisory report in line
narrative	with the needs of the competent authority. The
	competent authority can download supervisory
	reports via the connection system. The TPEx also
	discloses regularly on its website trading
	information, transaction volumes and outstanding
	amounts according to the market information reports
	approved by the competent authority for free inquiry
	by the public. The TR has a robust information
	system and provides timely, accurate and easily
	accessible data to the competent authority and the

public, which helps enhance market transparency
and supports the policy objectives of the competent
authority.

V. List of publicly available resources

Law and Regulation

- 1. Securities and Exchange Act
- 2. Regulations Governing Securities Firms
- 3. Taipei Exchange Regulations Governing Over-the-Counter Trading of Financial Derivatives by Securities Firms
- 4. Taipei Exchange Administration Rules for Financial Derivative Trade Database
- 5. Taipei Exchange Operation Directions for the Transmission of Financial Derivative Trade Data to the Clearing House

Publications

Annual Report of Taipei Exchange

<u>Website</u>

Taipei Exchange: http://www.tpex.org.tw